A Research On The Health Demand

This paper contains a detailed treatment of the human capital model of the demand for health which was originally developed in 1972. Theoretical predictions are discussed, and theoretical extensions of the model are reviewed.The review reveals three mechanisms physicians may use to influence quantity of care provided to patients: in an asymmetric-information context, taking an action to influence patient preferences. The third mechanism is known as "physician-induced demand." The empirical literature on this topic is reviewed. Theories are also reviewed.Health insurance and sick leave pay cause consumer incentives to be reflected in moral hazard effects of several types. Theoretically, ex ante moral hazard is not unambiguously predicted, and there is also very limited empirical evidence about dynamic moral hazard effect (choice biased in favor of new, usually more expensive medical technology).The case for static ex post moral hazard (an increase in the demand for medical care of a given technology) is stronger. The empirical evidence reported comes from three sources, natural experiments, observational, the responsiveness of the demand for medical care to net price is beyond doubt. The pure price elasticity for medical care in excess of a deductible (i.e. where the marginal price is constant) was estimated by HIE at -0.2 overall.In the last chapter,the author reviewed medical care demand in China.Some suggestions were put forward.