| Theft is a rather old crime, which traditionally studied mainly by criminology and jurisprudence. The very first research concerning the economic impact of theft began with GS.Becker, the so-called economics imperialist. Since then multiple efforts have been devoted to analyze the individual and social cost under different rule sets, and the adverse effect of theft to social welfare. However, few words had been said about the stolen goods market, and even fewer researchers had shown any concern about the concrete price forming mechanism of this special market, which is of great significance to sweep off theft crime from the buyer side or the market reduction approach.Thus, we will, in the paper, try to outline the fundamental price operating manner in a stolen goods market. After firstly introducing a hypothesis regarding the stolen goods price mechanism that the legitimate lag between legitimate right and economic rights stands to be the very reason why the trade of stolen goods, which is illegal for both sides is initially possible, our paper will offer out a formal analytical price model. We argue that the initial evaluation of potential buyer and seller about the targeting stolen goods in a given time point just reflects distinct efficiency and performance of local government, social capital, and the physical characteristic of the goods, which lately brings along different stimulant for the two parties' behavior and in the end results in different theft amount.The lag duration, which makes trade talk possible, also convinces the reason buyer that it might be profitable to pay for the stolen economic rights lease. Prosperity of theft strategy and trade of stolen goods in a particular area may accordingly erode the legitimate rule set established by the ruling party by forming up a collective acting mechanism. From this dynamic view, some clues regarding the origin and also evolution of legitimate right can be found in our model.
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