Congestion Cost Allocation Under Bilateral Transaction Using Shapley Value

Electricity market is the inevitable trend of electric industry in developing, which results in the change of the conventional power system in organization, and causes a series of new technique problems. It is unavoidable to congestion in power transmission. In order to guarantee the security and reliably of the power transmission network, congestion cost need to be allocated to consumers complying with economic efficiency requirements to make effective use of the network and reduce congestion happen. Typically, this cost is allocated using Nodal price and Uplift method. Nodal price results in merchandising surplus; Uplift method fails to provide efficient price sign to customers and has the drawbacks of computational complexity. In addition, because of nonlinear of electric power system, Uplift method is not an absolutely fair congestion cost allocation method.This paper introduces the concept of game theory at first. Based on cooperative game theory, a method complying with the knowledge of economics is proposed to allocation the congestion cost. And make the allocation of congestion cost have economics meaning. This paper presents a Shapley values based, one-step transmission congestion cost allocation for bilateral model, by abolishing some bilateral transactions to form various coalitions. Theoretical analysis and 6 bus example system case study show that the proposed method comply with requirements of economic efficiency and can give more accurate and equitable signals to customers due to the characters of exclusion, monotony, and additivity.At last, the bilateral Shapley value of cooperation game theory is proposed to allocate the congestion cost, to avoid the exponential complexity of Shapley value calculation by reducing the number of coalitions. It is one of improvement method of Shapley value. The computation challenges in applying Shapley value to large scale problems are addressed. The Bilateral Shapley value not only has the advantage of Shapley value but also overcomes the combination explosion in Shapley's coalition formation.