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Applications Of Cost Allocation Theory And Game Theory In Electricity Market

Posted on:2004-06-28Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:C Y HuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360122475019Subject:Power system and its automation
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The recent general reform order of State Electricity Regulation Council states that regional electricity market be formed based on the concepts of "single dispatch, single market, and single settlement". The consensus is that a unified regional electricity market would be beneficial to the optimal deployment of power resources and optimal coordination of power construction and environment protection, which is important for promoting the sustainable development of power industry.To ensure the stable operation of region electricity market, many problems concerning equitable allocation of common costs must be solved, such as allocation of transmission losses, allocation of unit start-up costs and allocation of merchandise surpluses and so on. These common costs have inseparable characteristic, namely we can not identify which load (unit) should be responsible for which part of common costs. For this reason, the equitable allocation of common costs is a difficult problem puzzling researchers and engineers.Besides, electricity price is one of the key issues of regional electricity market. To strengthen market supervision and ensure market stability, it is meaningful to deepen the study of electricity prices. Empirical evidences show that electricity prices are influenced by the strategic behaviors of generation companies. Hence study on the influences of strategic behaviors on electricity price is of much interest.This dissertation can be divided into two parts. The first part reports the application study of cost allocation theory in electricity market, including allocation of transmission losses, allocation of unit start-up costs and allocation of merchandise surpluses. The second part concerns the application study of game theory in electricity market, including design and analysis of auction experiment for electricity market and electricity price short-term, medium-term and long-term forecasting with consideration to market power.First, a Shapley Value-based method for allocation of transmission losses is proposed. Using this method each transaction is allotted a value equal to its expected incremental losses that the transaction occurs by joining the coalition. This methodweights all joining orderings equally across all possible related coalitions, therefore impartial participants would consider fair. Besides, this method can satisfy the break-even requirement and provide appropriate economical signals to transactions, which can promote the rational distribution of power demands to reduce total system losses.Secondly, cooperative game theory is applied to allocating unit start-up costs among loads. First, the concept of core allocation is introduced. Using a numerical example, the equity and rationality of allocation methods are discussed. Then the existence conditions of core allocation are studied. Based on the concepts of nucleolus and Shapley Value, the start-up costs in an operating single period are allotted to each load. The advantages and shortcomings of the two methods are examined. The allocation of unit no-load costs is also studied. Finally, multi-period startup cost allocation problem is studied, and two methods are suggested, In the first method, multi-period startup cost is allocated based on the allocation outcome of single-period allocation, while in the second method multi-period startup cost of a trading day is allocated as a whole. The allocation results are compared.Thirdly, the source of merchandise surplus in a pool-based market is introduced in brief. Then an attempt to allot merchandise surplus based on cost allocation theory is described. Through an example, the existence condition of core for allocation of merchandise surplus is discussed. After analysis on characteristic of merchandise surplus function, inapplicability of Aumann-Shapley allocation method and limitation of nucleolus allocation method are indicated. A Shapley Value-based allocation method is proposed. This method treats each load equally with easy calculation and can satisfy the break-even requir...
Keywords/Search Tags:electricity market, cost allocation theory, core, nucleolus allocation method, Shapley Value allocation method, transmission losses, unit start-up costs, merchandise surpluses, game theory, Nash equilibrium, market power, electricity price forecasting
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