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Research On Generator's Market Power Based On The Supply Function Model

Posted on:2006-04-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L L PengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2166360155962045Subject:Power system and its automation
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The world-wide introduction of competition among power generators to break monopoly aims at developing power markets and achieving efficient utilization of social resources. In the restructured power market, generators at the entities of taking part in competition can usually carry out their market power for manipulating market, thus to gain excess benefit. And it is an important task faced by market monitors to evaluate market power by analyzing conditions of market operating and strategic behaviors of generators. The market power assessment is helpful to design an applicable regulation system and corresponding rules which can mitigate market power and ensure efficient competition. The oligopoly game equilibrium theories are employed to simulate the strategic behaviors of generators in spot and future markets. The market power is evaluated with the benefits of generators in this paper.Based on the equilibrium price and output of perfect competition, the equilibrium results in Cournot and supply function models are compared analytically. The conclusion is that the linear supply function equilibrium (SFE) model is superior to Cournot model in simulating the strategic behaviors of generators. In spot market, the equilibrium functions of generators' economic withholding and physical withholding strategies are deduced respectively. The overall learning behaviors can lead to a steady market equilibrium state under repeated game. And the capacity constrains are chances offered for generators to carry out market power.In future contract market, the linear SFE model is employed to analyze the impact of future contracts on market power. The generators' interests of manipulating trade price are reduced by signing power contracts. Therefore the future contract is an effective tool to mitigate market power. The incentive mechanism of price and impact between generators are helpful to encourage generators into contract market. Furthermore, numerical simulations are given in this paper, which are used to demonstrate the impacts of demand elasticity and the number of power generators on market power. At last, some measures are given to mitigate market power.The research of this paper is helpful to the market monitors for market power prediction and standardizing market participants' behaviors. Therefore, more efficient market and policy-making could be achieved.
Keywords/Search Tags:Power Market, Game Theory, Market Power, Strategic Behavior, Supply Function Equilibrium, Future Contract
PDF Full Text Request
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