Research On Ownership Structure Of The Firm Based On The Interactive Mechanism Of Interest Group

The existing theory of the firm ignores analytical method of whole. The dissertation studies the formation and evolution of the ownership structure of the firm based on interactive choice of different interest groups. To achieve advantage produced by teamwork in a firm, or to achieve organizational rent produced in a firm, different participants organize the firm and the property rights system. Ownership structure of the Firm results from negotiation of participants who own different kinds of production factors. Differences between property rights of production factors and specific degree induce disadvantage position of manpower owners in negotiation. Physical capital owners' advantage leads to Shareholders' supreme power in the classical firm and the corporate firm. The dissertation introduces Olson's interest group theory and the public choice theory to analyze the interactive mechanism of interest groups in the firm. The author using a Voting paradox model as an analytical tool explains conflicts of interest in the negotiation process of ownership structure of the firm. With the position of manpower capital owner advancing, the ownership structure of the firm changes. There are mutual governance mechanism and profit sharing system between manpower capital and physical capital developed in the firm. The change of ownership structure of the SOE is the kernel component of the reform of SOEs. From the perspective of interest, in a transitional period, it is possible that institutional change of state owned enterprises may be affected by actions of relevant interest groups. According to Mancur Olson's, small groups are more powerful than big groups. Some small internal powerful interest groups may dominate the firm's institutional reform. This is an important reason why the ownership structure of the firm is improper after reform. The asymmetric and improper structure of property rights will result in gap of income distribution and failure of corporate governance. For the sake of objective requirements of coordinate improvement of interest relationships in the firm, we should follow the principles of compatible interests and positive sum game, and adjust the ownership structure of the firm and governance mechanism, and establish property rights of manpower. Key Words: Ownership of the firm, Interest Group, Interactive mechanism,...