Font Size: a A A

An Research Of Voting Rules For Villager Committee

Posted on:2007-12-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X G LuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2166360242461659Subject:Systems Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The institution of villager committee election has been executed for more than ten years, and there are many problems.One of the problems is that voting rules are not scientific and uniform.For finding scientific voting rules that fit our villager committee election,we try to do two things:First,the voting rules that have been used usually are compared,to find best voting rules.Second,the geometry models of the voting rules that have been used usually are tried to constitute,to optimize current voting rules by theoretic analyse.First,the importance of designing and optimizing voting rules is expatiated,the social choice theory is summarized,then social choice functiong and voting decision are introduced briefly.Paradox of voting and general impossibility theorem are expatiated briefly,and the effort to solve general impossibility theorem is introduced. Second,the geometry model of pairwise vote that has only three candidates and special three voting types is constituted,the voting outcomes are analysed,and the probability of all of the outcomes including cycle outcomes are computed.Two geometry models of positional vote that has only three candidates and special three voting types are constituted,then the geometry models are extended to all of the combination of three voting types by symmetry when there are three candidates.Then the conflict of voting outcomes of pairwise vote and positional vote is analysed with the models.Last,the voting rules that have been used usually in our country are introduced.The advantage and disadvantage of the methods are analysed contrastively.The feasibility of a voting method that is reasonable and doubted is proved,and trying to optimize the method with the models that are constituted in chapter three and chapter four.
Keywords/Search Tags:Paradox of voting, Positional vote, Pairwise vote
PDF Full Text Request
Related items