Research On The Problem Of The Property Right Of State-owned Enterprise And Administration Structure

This thesis is a cross-study based on economics and law. The thesis based its discussion on the relation between property rights and efficiency of the state-owned enterprises in China. With the comparative method and empirical analysis method,such problems have been studied: Firstly, what is the main reasons for the inefficient state-owned enterprises in China? Secondly, what model of governance should be adopted for the Chinese state-owned enterprises? Thirdly, what important function can the efficiency of Chinese state-owned enterprises be raised by the new system of property rights? Which are the subjects the economics and jurists want to resolve for long time .To answer the questions above-mentioned, we shall make researches into the relationship between the firm's efficiency to property rights. We shall also make researches into the influence of the governance and the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises in China, made by the non-correspondence of property rights.There are several creative results put forward in the thesis. Firstly, a new idea on the concept of property rights is raised, namely property rights are the rights enjoyed by different main bodies, who invest their property in anenterprise. Which is the foundation of deciding the firm's governance and arranging the firm's control and claim to the firm's residue between the stockholders and managers. Secondly, a new concept of non-correspondence of property rights is put forward for the first time. Which means that the firm's control and claim to firm's residue are in separated condition between the stockholders and managers.thirdly, the basic train of thought about transforming the governance of state-owned enterprises in China is raised, namely the model of joint governance by the stockholders, managers and workers should be adopted in small and middle enterprises. And the model of joint governance by the stockholders managers should be adopted in large enterprises and the public corporations. Fourthly, a creative idea on putting incentive stock option into effect for the state-owned public corporations in china is put forward. It is the key persons such as managers,directors and technical personnel not the whole workers who should be urged by incentive stock option in early days, or egalitarianism and mess together should be resulted. Fifthly, after analyzing the obstacles to the law, the author propose that the several provisions of "Corporate Law of People's Republic of China"should be revised.