Study Of The Competitive Means Of Defense Acquisition

In this thesis, based on the research of Defense Economics Experiment, auction mechanism, the competitive means of Defense Acquisition, is analyzed from the theoretical and experimental perspectives. From the research, we learn that both the Research Competition Auction Mechanism in the research phase and the Auction Purchase Mechanisms in the procurement phase are quite effective. The application of the Research Competition Auction Mechanism can induce the optimal research efforts, which the principal pursues; and the use of the Auction Purchase Mechanism can save lots of the supervising cost, which helps the principal acquire the optimal military goods at the minimum cost.The thesis consists of three interrelated and interactive parts, which advance step by step. These three parts are, the research of the defense acquisition experiment, the theoretical analysis of the defense acquisition, and the experimental research of the competitive means of defense acquisition.In Part One, based on the historical view of the research methodology of the economics and a summary of the research methods of the defense economics, the general process of the experimental research of the defense economics is proposed. In Part Two, the action of the defense acquisition is analyzed based on the Principal-agent Theory. From the contrastive research of the foreign defense acquisition system, the main means to achieve the acquisition aim are concluded. In the last part, an experimental research is put forward which is taken as the experimental test of the theoretical analysis.In the end, a conclusion is drawn from the research of the competitive means of the defense acquisition, including researching methods, the theoretical foundation, and the results of the research.