Investment Risk Analyse Of Defence Research Based On Asymmetric Information

At present,there are many problems, such as project's actual outlay going beyond budgetary estimate. postpone. the strictness of taking charge of small etc, in the management of national defense scientific research investment of china. these problems take from the resource's configure efficiency of national defense scientific research. By research, the asymmetric information in national defense scientific research was the important reason that drew down these problems. The paper analyses the national defense scientific research investment's decision-making phase,execution phase, the source is found out that asymmetric information come into being from, how does the asymmetric information affect the resource's configure efficiency of national defense scientific research investment.In this article, information economics has been applied to the research of the game between investor(army) and defense research institute. Army and defense research institute forms the relationship of principal-agent. defense research institute has more information than the army, which results in investor adverse selecting defense research institute and defense research institute's moral hazard. This article tries to study investor's agency venture due to asymmetric infornlation and how to conquer agency risk, make income to maximization.This article has following achievements:simulating the relationship between the army and national defense scientific research institute as a model; putting forward explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism;applying quantitative method to make analysis; applying KMRW model to establish an implicit incentive model direct against national defense scientific research institute; applying fuzzy mathematics to design a appraisal system which can appraise the ability of national defense scientific research institute.