China's Insurance Market, Asymmetric Information Problems Study

The subject of the dissertation is Asymmetric Information problems analysis of insurance market in China. This paper consists of three parts. First, the author introduces the theory of the Asymmetric Information in brief. On the base of the theory and experience of insurance market in China, the author divides this Asymmetric Information problem into four parts, such as adverse selection and moral hazard of the insured, adverse selection and moral hazard of the insurer. Second, this paper studies the reasons that the Asymmetric Information problems of insurance market in China happen are institution and credit. Third , the final part studies how we deal with Asymmetric Information problems of insurance market in China, comes to a satisfied conclusion.Compared with other papers, the main innovations in this paper includes: first, the paper points out clearly adverse selection and moral hazard of the insurer and analysts the reasons. Second, the author makes use of model analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard. Third, the paper studies the relationship between cultural tradition in China and Asymmetric Information problems of insurance market.Today, with the insurance market developing, it is an important task how to deal with Asymmetric Information problems of insurance market. Because if it cann't be hold back, it will lead to market failure. This is a hard task. I hope we can find out vaild measures on our objective environment.