The Research On The Mechanism Of The Accountability Of The Solely State-Owned Corporation's Director's Responsibility

In the "strong board of directors, weak shareholder" system design, the solely state-owned corporation's directors enjoy a lot of the rights of shareholder's it has stronger control of the company than the director of the general company; however, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission shoulders the responsibility of directing and supervising the management work state-owned assets, based on the specificity of state-owned shares ,the SASAC should not vote with their feet as the shareholders of the general company. Therefore it should make better supervision on the directors of solely state-owned corporation.In the first chapter of this article, it will analyze the concept and the types of the duty of directors, and define the scope of the study as the responsibility of the directors to the company. On this basis, it will discuss the three ways that how to accountability the duty of directors to the company .The main problem of the accountability of the directors in the state-owned corporation is that the SASAC lacks of the motive to and dependent on the internal administrative penalty too much.In the second chapter, the discussion focused on the reason why the accountability of solely state-owned corporation's directors depends on the causes of internal administrative penalties. It pointed out that the main reason is that way of director's selection in the solely state-owned corporation is special and the SASAC lacks the motive of accountability through the judicial way. By the way , although the existence of internal administrative punishment in itself is reasonable, but over-reliance on internal administrative penalties will be highlighted the lack of accountability of directors.In Chapter III, the paper highlights an analysis on the plight of the application of the shareholder derivative litigation in the solely state-owned corporation ; pointed out why that in the soly state-owned corporation the shareholder derivative litigation is missing, and on this basis made a proposal to fix it.In the last chapter , it will discuss the public interest litigation and the social supervision of the directors. On this basis, it analyzes the prosecutors, individual citizens, social groups respectively, and pointing out that prosecutors and individual citizens should have the rights to accountability the responsibility of the soly state-owned corporation's director.