The Completeness Of Dirctors' Annual Salary System In Wholly State-Owned Companies

As the core of the construction and standardization of corporate management structure in wholly state-owned companies, the board of directors has been a research hotspot in recent years. Facing the long-term"virtual home"problem of the board of directors in China's wholly-owned companies, a growing number of scholars believe that "strong board of directors, weak shareholder" is the basic pattern of the relationship between SASAC and the board of directors of wholly state-owned companies, and the establishment and improvement of a strong board of directors is imperative, therefore the incentive and restrictive questions of the board of directors of the wholly state-owned companies also appear to be particularly important. The ways to carry out an effective incentive and restraint system in strong board of directors of wholly state-owned companies has been a legal issue to be solved.As a distribution system based on responsibilities, risks, performance and other factors in a cycle of production and operation, annual salary system can link the interests of operators and business owners to make them focus on the same goal, which then can effectively impel and restraint the operators. This thesis will position the directors annual salary system problem of wholly state-owned companies in the large category of company management to explore the incentive and restraint mechanisms of the annual salary system for of wholly state-owned companies'directors in legal aspects, namely, to build the directors annual salary system to impel and restraint wholly state-owned companies directors'individual behaviors, thereby enhancing the performance of the board of directors of wholly state-owned companies, and improving the management system of wholly state-owned companies. This thesis consists of five parts, including the preamble, chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter III, as well as conclusions.In the preface the author reveals the importance of the director's annual salary system of China's wholly state-owned companies. After a collation of existing research results, the author explained the purpose, logical thinking and framework of this thesis, and then described the research methods and core concepts.In the first chapter, the author made a general evaluation of the value of the annual salary system through the exploration of the basic concepts, characteristics and the theoretical basis of the annual salary system, and then discussed the important position of the annual salary system in the directors inventiveness and restraint system of the wholly state-owned companies, followed by an analysis focusing on the effectiveness and unique role of annual salary system for inventiveness and restraint of the directors of wholly state-owned companies.Basing on chapter I, the author in Chapter II made a summary and discussed the main problems of the annual salary system in experimental implementation through the review and analysis of China's salary system experiments of annual salary system in state-owned enterprises and related legislation. These problems include the annual salary of state-owned operators on the high side, non-standard functional consumptions, as well as the inaccurate assessment standards of annual salary system. These analyses laid a foundation for the discussion of the perfectness of the directors'annual salary system of wholly state-owned companies in Chapter III.In the third chapter, the author firstly set out the principles of the annual salary system, and made suggestions from the angles of the adjustment of reasonable annual salary of directors in wholly state-owned companies, standardization of improper functional consumption, and improvement of assessment criteria of directors in wholly state-owned companies. At the same time, the author discussed the supporting systems through the improvement of personnel system and the establishment of supervision system.In the conclusion, the author deepened the theme of this thesis. The completeness of the annual salary system plays an important role to impel and constraint the directors of wholly state-owned companies and to improve the performance of the board of directors. Finally the author re-emphasized the proposals.