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The Management Performance Rise Of People's Procuratorates, An Economics Thinking And Its Pracitce

Posted on:2009-11-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S M ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2166360275454196Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As a common practice in the modernized production and a perennial issue in the contemporary society,the principal-agent relationship has been widely discussed in several disciplines,including Institutional Economics and Information-Based Economics.These existing findings have inspiringly indicated the origins of principal-agent relationship and the measures to reduce the lost it possibly caused. Based on these theories,the author tries to analyze a particular issue:the performance of self-administration in the Chinese prosecution institution.In the first place,this paper introduces the principles of the principal-agent theory,arguing that the core of this theory lies in how to design the optimal contract to encourage the agents.In the second place,form both the perspectives of theory and practice,this author analyzes why the principal-agent theory can be applied to the administration of prosecution intuitions.Then,the author suggests that this theory can provide seminal ideas to solve the pressing problems within the Chinese prosecution institutions,such as corruption,inefficiency and the lack of inducement.Based on the above discussions,the author then makes a case study of People's Procuratorate in Haizhu District,GuangZhou.This study introduces two measures to solve the principal-agent problems that exist within the everyday administration:first, the implements of standardized management and supervision over procuratorial work; second,the application of "the rule of golden section" to guide the distribution of "resources" within the working units and therefore to build an efficient incentive mechanism.In addition,the author presents the successful practice of Haizhu People's Procuratorate in applying "the rule of golden section" to combine the visible and invisible incentives in broad fields,like salary system,promotion,fiscal management, and honor awards.This part embodies the creativity of the author.In the last,the author summarizes the characteristics of the working-approach introduced above.This approach,which is based on principal-agent theory,sets the encouragement of people's incentive as its orientation so that it can be served to construct the scientific prosecution mechanism and to improve the effectiveness of regulation.Furthermore,in order to prove the significant success of his unit vis-a-vis other 12 paralleling institutions in GuangZhou,the author compares the detailed data in a multitude of aspects,including anti-corruption,anti-malfeasance,prevention of infringement upon citizen's rights,personnel recruitment and training,received honors,and responses from the people and the press.This success,according to the author,should be attributed to the working-approach discussed in this article.
Keywords/Search Tags:People's Procuratorates, Performance, Principle-Agency Theory, Golden Section
PDF Full Text Request
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