A Research On Actionability Of Macroeconomic Regulation Behaviors

The macroeconomic regulation is valued more and more. It is playing a significant role in the state economy management. But a wide range of problems are exposed slowly in our country macroeconomic regulation movement. The most controversial thing needed to be solved at present in our country is whether macroeconomic regulation behaviors are indictable or not.It is necessary to carry judicial review on macroeconomic regulation behaviors. It is the need of realizing the goal of macroeconomic regulation. It is the need of keeping authorities in balance. It is the government's need of realizing the macroeconomic regulation law and order. It is the need of internationalizing macroeconomic regulation. And more the jurisdiction has its unique function in the macroeconomic regulation process. At the same time, It is feasible to carry judicial review on macroeconomic regulation behaviors: First, "Constitution" , Article 2, Article 5 and Article 41 provide the constitution basis; Second, the macroeconomic regulation behaviors are not the national behaviors, so they should not be excepted the judicial review by the inevitable elimination; Third, the macroeconomic regulation behaviors have the elements of sue by the reform of the judicial system ; Fourth, only the validity of macroeconomic regulation behaviors will be reviewed, so the judicial review process has the feasibility; Fifth, carrying judicial review on macroeconomic regulation behaviors has the international experience to use for reference.However, not all macroeconomic regulation behaviors are indictable. The actionable macroeconomic regulation behaviors are divided into two levels: the indictable and sued easily macroeconomic regulation behaviors, and the indictable and sued difficultly macroeconomic regulation behaviors.When considering the indictable way of macroeconomic regulation behaviors, besides drawing on the experience of other countries we must be based on a combination of China's national conditions. The concrete and executive macroeconomic regulation behaviors are indictable through the "three traditional proceedings". But the special rules should be consistent with the characteristics of the macroeconomic regulation behaviors when the concrete and executive macroeconomic regulation behaviors are reviewed. The unconstitutional examination system provides indictable way to macroeconomic decision-making behaviors and abstract and executive behaviors. The introductions of public interest litigation and amicus curiae of macroeconomic regulation sue have a great significance.