Research On The Supplier Selection And Restraint Mechanism Of Military Special Purpose Material

This thesis mainly studied the significant issue--Military Special Purpose Material (ASSPM) supplier management. The study was composed of two aspects: the first one is about the adverse selection behavior of supplier's qualification camouflage in the supplier selection section; the second one is about the moral hazard behavior of supplier's concealment of material's real condition in the delivery section. The basic idea of this thesis is that the key to prevent and cure the agent problems of ASSPM supplier lies in how the constrain method presents.The thesis summarized the current condition of PLA's ASSPM procurement, and analyzed the affects on ASSPM procurement benefit aroused by the existing adverse selection problem and moral hazard problem before and after the contract-signing. Then, the thesis built two mathematic models for analyzing and solving the supplier's camouflage problem and moral hazard problem by applying the principal-agent theory in accordance with the existing problem, it reached some inspiration through model-operations and model-analysis.During the"selection"period, in order to make the supplier show its real cost information and comprehensive abilities, the military material procurement agency should design the best reward mechanism (BRM) with the following features: firstly, it should be consist of three parts, the initial payment, reward and punishment; secondly, the overall principle of the BRM designing is that the amount of reward and punishment could not be zero simultaneously, while the initial payment can be so; thirdly, the initial payment is a decreasing function of the reward, and it is a increasing function of the punishment; fourthly, the reward contract could be the best one only if the ASSPM procurement agency do not judge the supplier from their personal opinion. For the countermeasure part, this thesis put forward three solutions for solving the supplier's adverse selection problem, namely, to develop the potential supplier as broad as possible, to investigate the candidate supplier as deep as possible and to punish the disguising supplier as hard as possible.During the delivery stage, the requirements for making the supplier tell the fact of the material is to enhance the detecting possibility of supplier's concealing behavior and the punishment degree if the behavior is detected, that means the procurement agency should strengthen the inspection and punishment degree towards the supplier and make that punishment playing the leading role in supplier constrain process. The punishment after the detection of supplier's concealing behavior should distinctly heavier than the one towards the truth-tell but inferior-material-providing supplier. The key for constraining the supplier should be decreasing the information asymmetric, namely, the investigation for moral hazard. Lastly, for the solutions of supplier's moral hazard problem, the thesis promoted four countermeasures, that is, to build a efficient supervising and constrain mechanism, to strengthen the contract management, to adopt positive incentive measures and to foster healthy partnership between the procurement agency and supplier.