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Study On The Power Configuration Between China's Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agencies And Industry Regulatory Bodies

Posted on:2011-04-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H S WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2166360305981467Subject:Economic Law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
After having debated and bargained for thirteen years, Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred as Anti-monopoly Law) has been officially promulgated in 2007, and implemented from the year of 2008. However, the issue of power configuration between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies has not been clarified yet. In the course of the legislative process of Anti-monopoly Law, the draft legislation has been drafted for several times resulted from the issue. Unfortunately, Anti-monopoly Law chose to avoid the issue when promulgated, resulting in cross-power conflict between anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies. There is no doubt that such legislation will impair the implementation of Anti-monopoly Law in depth and the reform and development of monopoly industries. Clearing allocation of powers between the two institutions is becoming the urgent issue. In view of this, the thesis adopts the comprehensive means of empirical analysis, comparative analysis, historical analysis, systems analysis and other research methods to explore the issue of power distribution between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies.In addition to introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis is divided into four parts.The first part mainly discusses on the current power allocation pattern between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies. First of all, this part sets out the current status of the power configuration between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies. Further, the thesis points out the drawbacks of power allocation pattern. Finally, the thesis concludes the roots of causes of the current power allocation pattern in three aspects.In the second part, the thesis explains international experience of the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies on the power configuration. The section classified several typical patterns of power allocation between the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies in respective countries (regions) ,namely, the industry regulatory bodies totally under the jurisdiction model, anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies totally under the jurisdiction model, anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies governing mode which is subdivided into power-sharing co-jurisdictional model and decentralized cooperation jurisdiction model. Furthermore, the thesis explains international experience and comes to the conclusion that bases on the perspective of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions.The third part of the thesis is about the selection of power configuration between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies. First of all, this part analysis the actual background of re-configuration the power between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies in three aspects : the objective needs of reform of monopoly industries, the actual needs of competition policy which is better than industrial policy, the response of enforcement in complying with the WTO rules. Furthermore, the thesis points out that the power distribution should be abided by the following four principles: the principle of maximum efficiency, the principle of difference-cooperation, the principle of mutual restraint and the principle of localization and dynamic nature. Finally, the thesis elaborates the mechanism of the choice of the main-auxiliary power configuration mode.In the fourth part, the thesis focuses on the establishment of the main-auxiliary power configuration mode between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies. In this part, the thesis firstly discusses the design of the main-auxiliary power configuration mode between China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and industry regulatory bodies, and then explores the interactive control power mechanism of the two types of institutions. Besides, it is also explained in the views of the external supervision, performance evaluation and other external security mechanisms which could be combined the internal and external integration into the system that is interactive and harmonious.
Keywords/Search Tags:Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agencies, Industry Regulatory Bodies, Power Configuration, Main-auxiliary Type of Power Configuration
PDF Full Text Request
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