The Fantasy Problem In Husserl 's Fantasy, Image Consciousness And

Husserl used the terminology of “image” in many situations, even though the representation is really the most obvious and typical characteristic, but we could get the definitive property of “image”—from the narrowest definition of image consciousness—in a strict sense. The imaging consciousness as description is always the key. It might be known that whether so-called “perceptual phantasy” in the watching plays like normal pictures has qualification or not to be attributed to “image” and shares “perceptual phantasy” this kind of complex apprehension with it when we have that fulcrum. In fact, the imaging consciousness is the only real complex apprehension. The other question of image consciousness which is connected with phantasy that is explained in this thesis is that Husserl assumed we could go into the analysis of the structure about phantasy—or rather, the apparency—from the structure of image consciousness we have. In spite of being a tempting thinking, if we realize their different situations in the apprehension and other aspects, we won’t be misunderstood by this lure—though it might to be agreed that representation is their common trait.In all kinds of the consciousness of consciousness, “phantasy of phantasy” is the most special and knottiest problem undoubtedly, and among those we have four cases certainly which are produced by phantasy combined with memory each other. It should be said that we could have one modification in one time at most, so we couldn’t have more than secondary modification. However, this will involve the analysis of memory and time consciousness. Husserl’s point about memory modification in the Lectures on Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time could be regarded as the support of this point. The situation about consciousness of consciousness rendered Husserl proposed the concept of “phantasy self”, but it seemed that the setting about that concept isn’t enough, and it faces many difficulties to be overcome—this certainly involves the later concept of “double self”.In Husserl’s Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory, he mentioned the problem of position taking in the phantasy yet. If position taking in the aesthetics has no connection with reality of objects as Husserl’s smart judgement, then the position taking about other feelings should be also like this—whether they are in the situation of empathy or any other phantasy. In the statement of aesthetic position taking, Husserl gave the concept of “mere phantasy”, taking this as the entrance may distinguish phantasy as presentation and thinking, to avoid the possibility of some vagueness. This could help us to understand the conversion between belief and position taking further. In this part, it is inevitable to encounter the problem of “phantasy self” and “phantasy subject” again, without referring to Husserl’s intersubjective problem further, but at least, to his doing of require “phantasy subject”, and then “phantasy self” by phantasy possibility which doesn’t provide enough reason for its requirement.