Study On Cadre's Incentive Mechanism In China

At present, while cadres in China have had a great contribution on the governance of rural society and development & management of rural collective economy, they also have exposed a lot of problems such as corruption. When their social role has changed from original role to alienate role and lastly to regression to original role, it is necessary to design a valid incentive mechanism motivating cadres in China. The dual role, which is a kind of alienate role, is widespread received as an ideal analysis of cadres in China, but it always face such dangers as the potential role failure of cadres which will result in incentive failure of them. These difficult problems can be alleviated by common agency which is the latest research achievements of the principal-agency theory. Using the common agency theory, this paper can provide a systematic scheme to design of the cadres'incentive mechanism. With the tax-free epoch of China's agriculture coming into being, the changing macro policy environment will make the common game rule of cadres change, and the common agency role of cadres will lead task-substitute turn into task-complementary. So this paper can build incentive mechanism of complementary common agency. Based on analysis of rural questionnaires data from Chang-wu County in Shaanxi province, this paper firstly analyses how the incentive factors make their devotion to cadres'total incentive, then make some designation of concrete incentive mechanism after the common agency theory and the 3600 all participation rule. This paper expounds mainly in 6 chapters. The first chapter is introduction; the second is the change of cadres'social role; the third is common agency of cadres; the forth is contribution of each incentive factors; the fifth is design of incentive mechanism of cadres from reward, development, reputation and institution of rural residents autonomy; the last is conclusion.