The Analyse Of Unsymmetry Of The Proper Right Structure Of The State-owned Enterprise In China

In the modern joint-stock company, the property right structure is arranged like this :ownership and control are separated and it is proved to be efficient. But in the state-owned enterprises in China, the efficiency is very slow. There are so many reasons such as the many workers , behineded equipments and so on. While the most important reason is the unsymmetry of the property right structure. The property structure has two parts: residual rights of control and claim to residue. Only when they are arranged reasonably, the enterprise can reach its aim: full profit. But in fact, in the state-owned enterprises in China, the residual rights of control and claim to residue are not harmonious. The mangers and the directors haven't the claim to residue. Scarce of the incentive, They aren't care for the production , not speak to the profit.On the contrary, they try their best to get much from the enterprise during their post.So, the reform to the stated-owned enterprises in China should pay more attention to the property rights structure. Not only the residual rights of control, but also the claim to residue should be given to mangers and directors as incentive. At last, we still admit the function of the human capital and optimize the Company's administration structure.