A Study On Property Rights Structure Of Commercial Bank Based On GHM Model

The finance is the core of modern economy and the banking is the core of thefinance in China. As an increasingly important subject of interest in a marketeconomy of China, commercial bank is to ensure that entrepreneurial spirit continuesto climb, and directly impacts on macroeconomic stability, and relates to the safety ofthe country’s financial system. The reform of commercial bank has become the majorissues related to national development and stability.In order to systematically analyze the ownership structure of the commercialbank, this paper collates and summarizes the development of the theory of the firm.The mainstream theory of the firm is divided into two categories. One categoryincludes those that neglect property rights and take them as given including theneo-classical theory of the firm and the principal-agent theory. The other includesthose which recognize the importance of property rights including the transaction costtheory and the stakeholder theory and the modern property rights theory.Commercial bank is a special kind of enterprise, and the theory of the firm usingto analysis the structure of property rights of banking is essentially the shareholders’bottom-up model based on principal-agent theory and the stakeholders model basedon stakeholder theory. But whether the shareholders’ bottom-up model or thestakeholder model has nothing to do with the company’s core competence, it can’texplicate the emerging reality and economic phenomena reasonably. For this, we hopethe GHM model and its development could analyses and researches the propertyrights structure of modern commercial bank, and then we can understand the propertyrights structure of commercial bank in China clearly, to find out the fundamentalcauses which exist in modern commercial bank’s property rights structure. So it canprovide guidance and reference for the reform on structure of property rights inChina’s commercial bank.According to the important residual rights of control, the firm property rightsstructure has many forms. But essentially said, the process is the transition of scarcefactor from capital to knowledge. In this paper, our commercial bank is located inpost-managerial firm. According to the core competence of enterprises, the peoplewith residual control rights are divided into shareholders, the owners of themanagement knowledge, the owners of the research and development of knowledgeand the owners of marketing knowledge, then we analyses their property rightsseparately, and proposed the residual claim should be allocated to these people whohaving residual rights of control in commercial bank. And we give some propositionto the reform of property rights structure of commercial banks in China.