The Theoretical And Empirical Research Of M&A Motivation Of Listed Corporations In China

M&A is a powerful means for enterprises to develop transnormally, and M&A motivation is explained from corporation management mechanism angle and corporation decision mechanism angle in theoretical circles. The original intention of M&A is to promote the value of corporation and optimize the resource configuration, while the wonderful perspective is only based on the right decision and complete implementation. Beginning with the analysis of CEO's motivation, the decision maker and executor. , the thesis empirically studies the behavioral motivation of M&A and explains the causes why enterprises carry on M&A frequently under the condition that M&A brings about negative effects in a long term.The thesis takes the acquiring corporation in M&A as the research object. First, the accounting study which is fit for the status nowadays in china is adopted to construct the index system for the verification of the corporations' performance. We come to the conclusion that the performances of the exact year when M&A occurred, one year after M&A occurred and two years after M&A occurred are all worse than which of the year before M&A occurred. That is, current effect and long term effect are negative. Then we synthetically analyze the causes of ruined-value M&A combining the internal decision motivation with the outer market environment, and point out that agency cost, behavioral cost and institutional cost play important roles in the M&A occurrence. Next, on the basis of the research of Malmendier and Tate (2002) ,we study M&A motivation of listed corporation in China.The result is: 1. M&A in China can't improve the corporation's performance and however, it will be worsened. To develop transnormallyby the means of M&A is to be questioned. 2. CEO's agency cost andbehavioral cost mainly urge the decision-making of value-ruined M&A.That is, CEO's moral hazard and mental bias are the main causes of M&Aactivity.