Research On Keeping Away Of Moral Hazard In The Stated-owned Enterprises' Managers

How to improve the efficiency of enterprises, especially state-owned enterprise is the issue which has been discussed in recent years theorists. In 1979, China's state enterprise reformed, and despite the expansion of 1979-1982, allowing more profits, the tax payment in lieu of 1983-1986, 1986-1991, the contract responsibility system, 1992-1993 and 1994, a shareholding establishment of a modern enterprise system, enterprise innovations stage and scored remarkable achievements, but the efficiency of state-owned enterprises had not fundamentally resolved. Along with the enterprise reform, modern enterprise system gradual establishment and consummation, people realized that moral hazard in the stated-owned enterprises' managers is the important reason that blocks the radical improvement of the state-owned enterprise efficiency. How to guard against moral hazard in the stated-owned enterprises' managers becomes the core question of state-owned enterprise.This article embarks from the research of moral hazard in the request - proxy theory, and expounds the behavior display of moral hazard in the our state-owned enterprise as well as the reason why it brings, and combines the evolution, the present situation and the existence question of our state-owned enterprise manager reward system evolution, and induces the key to guard against moral hazard lies in the establishment effective state-owned enterprise manager's drive, the restraint mechanism and the inspector general mechanism. Regarding the deepening state-owned enterprise reform, enhancing the management efficiency of the state-owned enterprise, this article shows the certain theory and the practical significance.The basic content of the article will involve four following major parts:In part one, it is mainly about the theory analysis of moral hazard. Mainly launch from three respects: Firstly, I elaborate the connotation of moral hazard, from the point of view of request - proxy relation, I point out that the meaning of the moral hazard is that Party A of the agreement (agent usually), utilizes information advantage Party B (client usually) to adopt agreement that has its hiding that can't be observed and supervised takeaction or not, thus the one that cause (client) Lose or (agent) Lucrative possibility. Then, I analyze the reason why moral hazard produces in terms of relation between client and agent, mainly including three points: Nonconformity of subject interests;Asymmetry of information;Uncertainty of the reality and incompleteness of the agreement. Finally, I use the theory of incomplete information game dynamically to set up a model of precaution against moral hazard. Combining this model, I point out it is necessary to set up one encouragement and tied mechanism , immoral cost to strengthen agent inside enterprise, reduce the immoral income, change its immoral behavior into ethical seeking the favorable behavior.In part two, I mainly launch from moral hazard in the stated-owned enterprises' managers. It mainly involves the contents of three respects: First of all, I analyze the behavioral behavior in the state-owned enterprise of moral hazard;Then, combine the detailed conditions of the state-owned enterprise of our country and summarize out the reason why manager's moral hazard of state-owned enterprise of our country produces;Finally , point out the route to take precautions against manager's moral hazard of state-owned enterprise of our country —Encourage restraint and supervision mechanism.In part three, I launch describing mainly from supervision mechanism of taking precautions against moral hazard in the stated-owned enterprises' managers: Firstly, the main behavior regarding the manager of state-owned enterprise supervised without working, including legal system supervises the omission, administrative supervision becomes a mere formality, supervise inside enterprises weakly, the company makes enterprise's operation and has not got on the right track.In part four, it is mainly the argumentation about the encouragement tied mechanism which takes precautions against the moral hazard. It mainly involves the contents of two respects: the first one is about encourage tied mechanism of the remuneration. It explains the encouragement function on the manager of remuneration mechanism at first, expounds the development of manager's remuneration system of state-owned enterprise subsequently, and then described the system of stock option especially. Through analyze, it proves under our country existing terms, stock option produce effects to state-owned enterprise encouragement function of manager a little, in the end it proposes equilibratingaccumulating card and EVA finally (Economic value-added ) System of stock option of the performance of combining together;The second part is about the encourage tied mechanism of control power. Firstly, I expound the intension of control power, then prove emphatically control power encourages restraining mechanism, summarize mechanism's characteristic of manager's control power of state-owned enterprise of our country in that "administration disposes control power" and "the insider control" coexist in the following, provide some suggestions of setting up the effective state-owned enterprise manager's control power mechanism finally.