The Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of Avoiding Moral Hazard Of Insurance Agents

Under the background of the transformation of management conception and goal, which substitute sales maximum for profits maximum, the article focuses on the frequent occurrence of moral hazard caused by the ex post asymmetric information between the principal and agent, and employs information economics and management theory to research the moral hazard of Chinese insurance agents. By analyzing the causes and effects, we find that moral hazard is aggravated by the old incentive mechanism which includes crude sales assessment system, inelastic traditional commission system, explicit and implicit mechanisms fulfilled badly. It is imperative to construct scientific rational incentive mechanism. By thoroughly analyzing the reality with the interrelated principia, the article makes research on the moral hazard with hidden action, which is delegated by the ignorance of the performance and business quality, short-range tendency and frequent occurrence of offence behavior, and the moral hazard with hidden information, which is delegated by hidden the state of world, business quality and professional quality. It also preliminarily sets up comparatively integrate incentive mechanism to keep moral hazard away. We find that insurers can encourage the personal agents to focus on the performance and business quality, attune the long-run and short-run substitutive behavior by themselves, abide by the vocation regulation forwardly and improve professional quality voluntarily, by means of bringing the agents into the performance management ,innovating the laggard marketing management mode, creating scientific performance appraisal system, implementing increasing and levelized commission schedule, ensuring the commission claims of continuous years establishing incentive mechanism of specific human capital investment and subjective offence behavior restriction mechanism, which exerts adequately explicit and implicit incentive mechanisms, analyzing the cultivation demand and training individually.