Human Capital Property Rights In The Public Administration

The issue of corruption is the focal point in political and administrational inquires. The writer has established a framework for research of bureaucrat's property rights of human capital. The research tries to prove that human capital property rights work as an interior mechanism affected bureaucrat behavior selection and further affected the efficiency of government administration.Initially, the work retrospects many achievements of several relative social sciences to define the corruption and its harm. Thereafter the research tried to explain the bureaucrat's property rights of human capital based on the general human capital property right. As the result of further proving, the writer give us a detailed definition of bureaucrat's property rights of human capital in four facets as follow: the direct control power to bureaucrats' own capacity, the domination power to public resources, the domination power to surplus proceeds, and the controlling power to mortgage of breach responsibility. Any one of the four powers was believed to influence the behavior selection of bureaucrats. To justify those points of view, the writer has utilized simple economic model to analyze the corruption and its institutional causation. And eventually writer gave some suggestions as to the current bureaucratic institution deducing from the theory.The writer believes this research testified that the property right of human capital theory is instructive on both efficiency promotion and anti-corruption fields.