The Study On Executives Of China's Listed Bank Incentive Compensation Mechanism

In recent years, the bank's corporate governance has aroused wide attention from scholars. As an important aspect of a bank's internal governance mechanisms, the executive pay incentive mechanisms has become the focus of research. With the changement of the incentive way, the executive pay rises quickly. The phenomenon has aroused wide attention from the government and the public. Therefore, the study of China's listed banks incentives to executive pay is not only of theoretical significance but also a practical significance. The article is by analyzing the relationship between the short-term executive pay, the proportion of executives holding and the performance to test whether China's listed banks have established a short-term executive compensation incentive mechanism and long-term executive compensation incentive mechanism.Introduction This paper describes the first part of the background ,significance to the study, summarized the status of foreign and domestic researchment. on the basis, The paper presents research ideas: first introduce the main motivation theory and executive compensation incentive mechanism of the U.S. and the Germany's Commercial Banks and analysis of China's Listed Bank incentives specificity; then statistical analysis of the status of China's listed banks' Executive compensation incentive mechanism. followed by measurement methods using empirical analysis of China's listed banks' short-term executive incentives and long-term executive incentives. The article concludes that since 2004, the short-term executive pay and performance in China is basically a positive correlation, and there is no positive correlation between the executives shareholding ratio and performance shows that the basic set up of China's listed banks short-term executive incentive compensation mechanisms, but the long-term pay incentive compensation mechanisms have not been established. Finally, according to both empirical and theoretical analysis of executive compensation on improving incentives has made specific recommendations, and pointed out that the lack of this study and future research directions.This more comprehensive overview of existing literature, empirical research of China's listed banks executive pay incentives by using of quantitative analysis, innovative point of this article is: Because of data limitations, listed bank executive compensation incentive mechanism research by previous scholars is mainly qualitative research, In this paper, the empirica research of the listed bank's short-term executive incentive compensation mechanism and long-term executive incentive compensation mechanism of research by multiple regression analysis.