Analysis Of Equity Incentive Programs Of Shenzhen Wanke

Separation of ownership and management rights produced the traditional agency problems. Shareholders and managers are linked through a series of contracts, however, their Interest objectives are not consistent. Based on the rational behavior economics, during their pursuiting their own maximum interests, people have natural interest conflict. This natural quality embodied in the asymmetric information between shareholders and managers, incomplete contract and the undetermined efforts standards of the manager and so on. As an effective long-term incentive mechanism, equity incentive will be able to ease the agency problem substantially between shareholders and managers, avoid short-term behavior, and promote long-term development. Therefore, we must consider the equity incentive with a case of a company. Here we start researching by the actual situation of Shenzhen Vanke's equity incentive program, making use of some relevant theories to analyze the Shenzhen Vanke's equity incentive programs comprehensively and systematicly, describing the content of its program, summarizing the reasons for its failure, doing a detailed analysis for the reasons of its failure, and summarizing the inspiration of improving equity incentive system in China from the case studies.PartⅠ, introduction. It is about the background of the topic, significance, research status, structure and innovation.PartⅡ, basic principles of equity incentives. It is about the concept and types of equity incentives and analyzes the theoretical basis of equity incentives, including agent theory, incentive theory, enterprise contract theory and human capital theory.PartⅢ, the motivation of Shenzhen Vanke's equity incentive and the implementation. This section introduces the basic situation of Shenzhen Vanke and its corporate governance structure, and analyzes the motivation and the main contents of the equity incentive program of Shenzhen Vanke, it also illustrates the results of the implementation.PartⅣ, the analysis based on the Shenzhen Vanke equity incentive plan and implement the results. Based on the previous case studies of Shenzhen Vanke's equity incentive program, there is a detailed analysis and evaluation, and some analysis to the reasons for the failure of the equity incentive system, from all of that, the paper get some Inspiration of the Implementation of equity incentive.PartⅤ, reflection to the Shenzhen Vanke's equity incentive programs. This section points out the problems existed in the equity incentive of Listed Companies in China, and some suggestions about completing the equity incentive, the paper also point out some issues needed to be cared in the equity incentive programs designed in China's listed companies.PartⅥ, the conclusion. The paper makes conclusions for the last five sections and pointed out the limitations, and some issues still need to be summarize in the future.The innovation is:First, make use of case study method, analyze the equity incentive program of Shenzhen Vanke systematic and comprehensive, the reasonable terms and unreasonable. the second, drawing on case of Shenzhen Vanke proposed how to establish a reasonable equity incentive programs, and how to establish and improve internal and external environment of enterprises, thus contributing to our equity incentive play a truly effective incentive.