Research On The Relation Of The Managerial Ownership And Corporate Performance About Listed Companies In China

Managerial ownership acts as an incentive mechanism has been widely acknowledged and implemented in western developed countries since the last half of 20th century. Meanwhile, more and more listed companies in our country are becoming interested in managerial ownership for various reasons, especially the reform of non-tradable shares. This article is for the purpose of analyzing the relations between the managerial ownership and corporate performance about listed companies in our country, including their cause and effect , the factos that impact the relations between them.Firstly, this article looks back the managerial ownership mechanism used in the listed companies in china, and analyzes the problems about it; Secondly, reviews the theoretical and empirical research in this area, in order to find out the potential research area. Lastly, based on the listed companies from 2001 to 2005 in our country, designs a linear and a non-linear model to analyze the relations between the managerial ownership and corporate performance. This article finds:(1) The relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance turn out to be both a linear and a non-linear one. These two models have the same explanation and forecast ability, due to the low level of managerial ownership in our country. And the convergence of intrests hypothesis is more suitable in china;(2) By buliding up a single model and a SEM model, the article finds managerial ownership and corporate performance are interactional. Managerial ownership is not only an incentive instrument but also acts as a reward measure;(3) The more competitive industry the company faces, the better effect of managerial ownership mechanise makes. The Beyond Property-Right Theory proved to be right in our country;(4) Structural factors of managerial ownership have large impacts to the relation between managerial ownership and corporate performance.