Research On Correlation Of Management Stock Ownership And Corporate Performance Of The Listed Companies In SME Board

When company's ownership and management separates,principal-agent problem arises.This problem differs the goals of principal and agent,resulting in agency costs.In order to make agent's actions consistent with the goal of owners and reduce agency costs,business owners should establish an incentive system to monitor and encourage operators.Therefore,managerial ownership arises as a response to the agency costs of the incentive system,which has been widely recognized and promoted in the Western countries.From the Western practice,management shareholding system is considered to be one of the main countermeasures to solve this problem.In managerial ownership,the business operators are the owners,in order to achieve the convergence of interests between the two parties.Compared with foreign countries' situation,the institutional environment and market environment of Chinese listed companies were significantly different.As a result,correctly understanding the characteristics of managerial ownership plays an important role in improving the governance of listed companies in China.Chinese SME board officially launched in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on May 27,2004,which lasted more than seven years of construction and has been rapid development.Different from the main board listed companies,the phenomenon of managerial ownership in SME board companies is more common.Therefore,this paper focuses on the companies listed on SME board.After deleting companies have been suspended delisting,ST companies,companies with missing financial data and companies of financial industry,I choose the financial reports of 709 companies listed on SME board from year 2011 to 2015 as sample,empirical analysis as the main research methods to demonstrate the relationship between corporate performance and managerial ownership of the companies listed on SME board.On the basis of previous studies,this paper introduces principal-agent incentive theory,human resources theory and internal control theory.On this basis,this paper puts forward hypotheses focused on the situation of managerial ownership of China's SME board listed companies according to the relevant theories.Based on the correlative theory and research,this paper establishes a comprehensive evaluation model of corporate performance by using principal component analysis,and constructs a model about therelationship between corporate performance and managerial ownership by using regression analysis method,and explains the sample selection.Then this paper tests the relationship between the existence of managerial ownership or not and the performance of companies and uses the model constructed above to carry out empirical analysis to justify the hypotheses.The empirical results show that the performance of China's SME board listed companies with managerial ownership is better than that without managerial ownership,and there is an interval effect on the relationship between the proportion of managerial ownership and corporate performance.When the proportion of management shares is less than 10% or greater than 50%,the performance of companies and management shareholding ratio is positively related;when the management share ratio is between 10% and 50%,the performance of companies and management shareholding ratio is negatively related.Finally,in view of a series of problems existing in managerial ownership in the current stock market,this paper puts forward relevant proposals and points out the future research direction.