| With more than ten years of development, the governance mechanism in state-controlled listed companies has become established and gradually perfect. But there is still much bewilderment about the compensation incentive for the operators. For example, the relatively low overall level and the singular structure of remuneration. It is becoming the kernel of deeper reformation of state-owned enterprises to formulate a reasonable operators' income system to motivate the operators to behave coherently with the owners' goal and reduce the commission cost.Considering the problems concerned above, firstly the common laws of incentive including economics and managerial incentive theories are generalized in this dissertation. Based on an investigation of the operator compensation incentive patterns in America, Japan and Germany, the implementing backgrounds of the incentive patterns of these countries are analyzed dialectically in order to apply these advanced mechanisms. Secondly, based on the analysis of the history and actuality of state-owned enterprise operator compensation incentive system, the existent problems and defects at present are concluded and the macroscopical and microcosmic circumstances which operators are faced with are expatiated according to the situation in China.Based on the data of state-controlled listed companies of Hebei Province in 2006, five variables are selected from factors which influence operators' salaries including general assets, net capital yield, state-owned stock proportion, operators' owned and negotiable stock proportion. The correlativity between operators' reward and the five factors is investigated by using Eviews software, and hypotheses are put forward and tested by modeling. Finally considering reformation practice in Hebei Province and the demand for the future, three operator compensation patterns are summed up: hypo-officeholder pattern, pluralistic non-owned stock pattern and pluralistic owned stock pattern. |
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