Font Size: a A A

Research On The Principal-Agent Problem Of China Venture Capital

Posted on:2012-04-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q XuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189330332490151Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Cultivating and developing emerging industries of strategic importance is the important measure, which is focusing on China's economic and social sustainable development, accelerating the transformation of the economic development mode, the adjustment of economic structure. Venture capital plays an important role in the development of emerging industries of strategic importance. Venture capital is actually a kind of investment mechanism among scientific research. enterprise and finance and is considered as an impetus to the development of high and new technology.Venture capital is a special kind of investment activity, investment and financing mode, including three participants that are investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. In the process of venture capital operation, there are special double Principal-agents:the first layer of principal-agent comes into being between investors and venture capitalists and the second between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs. Therefore, the risk of principal-agent is more complicated. Especially, venture capital in China is still a preliminary stage, there are still many problems. So paper researches how to reduce the risk of principal-agent in China's VC and improve the operating efficiency of VC, which has great theoretical value and realistic significance.First of all, the paper review the principal-agent achievements attained at home and abroad, analyze double Principal-agent and its problem in venture capital; Secondly, establishing the model to analyze how to establish proper incentive and constrained mechanisms, which will strive to resolve two layers of principal-agent. In order to resolve the incentive and constraint mechanism between investors and venture, the paper establishes reward discernment model and reputation incentive model. In order to resolve the risk of principal-agent between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs, the paper establishes separating equilibrium model. These models Offer theoretical basis for the study of principal-agent in venture capital. Thirdly, on the basis of the principal-agent study, the paper analyzes the present development situation of the venture industry in our country and the principal-agent problem. Fourthly, the paper puts forward some solutions and suggestions from two stages of investment and financing. Finally, Point out this research insufficiency and the limitation place.
Keywords/Search Tags:Venture capital, principal-agent, adverse selection, moral hazard
PDF Full Text Request
Related items