Study On The Influence Of Management Compensation Incentive On Information Disclosure Quality

Information disclosure is the important link and bridge between information producers and information demanders. Information disclosure quality is directly related to the effective decision of external stakeholders and the healthy and orderly development of stock market. Existing studies have shown that perfection degree of corporate governance has a significant impact on listed companies'information disclosure quality. As the major component of corporate governance, can management compensation incentive affects information disclosure quality and then play governance role? This is worthy of further study.Existing studies argue the corporate governance effects of management compensation incentive on information disclosure quality just from short-term incentive or long-term incentive, and most studies select listed companies'data before 2005 as the study samples. However, in recent years, the implementation of the share reform and stock incentive policy brings a significant impact on listed companies. Along with this, management compensation incentive has changed, and its governance effects on information disclosure may have new changes. Therefore, using the new data of sample companies to test the governance results of management compensation incentive on information disclosure quality is necessary. This article chooses Shenzhen Stock Exchange's listed companies from 2006 to 2009 as research objects, uses information disclosure assessment results of listed company as the proxy for information disclosure quality, and makes existing condition analysis of information disclosure quality. The short-term incentive and long-term incentive are brought into the study at the same time. Considering the salary control of state-owned enterprises, this article brings management non-pecuniary compensation into short-term incentive. Combined with China actual institutional background, the sample companies are divided into state and non-state groups according to the company's largest shareholder's nature, and then researching the different impact of short-term incentive on information disclosure quality of different ownership type.In the empirical study, through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and logistic analysis, examining management compensation incentive's governance effects to information disclosure quality of listed companies from management annual salary, non-pecuniary compensation, managerial ownership and the cross-variable of management annual salary and managerial ownership. Empirical results show that the management annual salary of short-term incentive has a significant positive effect on information disclosure quality, while non-pecuniary compensation inhibits the improvement of information disclosure quality, and this relationship is more obvious in the state-owned holding companies; the information disclosure quality of the listed companies which management holds shares is higher than the companies that management do not holding shares; in addition, the greater proportion management's stake, the higher quality of information disclosure; the cross-variable of management annual salary and managerial ownership has played a positive promoting role in information disclosure quality, which illustrate that combination of long-term and short-term incentive motivation mechanism has some incentive effects on improving information disclosure quality.