A Study On Moral Hazard Aversion In The Social Medical Insurance Based On Incentive Scheme

The moral hazard in the medical insurance market mainly include the moral hazard of medical service supplier, the moral hazard of medical service demander and the moral hazard of medical institutions. The focus of this paper is the problem of the moral hazard of medical service supplier and the moral hazard of medical service demander, starting from the generation principium of moral hazard in social health insurance, this paper puts forward the problem to control and prevent moral hazard by means of incentive scheme. In addition, the incentive schemes are categorized into two types:positive incentive schemes and negative incentive schemes, the positive incentive schemes include:material incentive, spiritual incentive, self-regulating mechanism, performance incentive. The negative incentive schemes include:income compensated negative incentive scheme, supervising scheme, salary system. By use of theories and various countries concrete practices, this paper analyzes the preventing problem of the moral hazard of medical service supplier and the moral hazard of medical service demander. Theoretically, by establishing the principal-agent model,this paper put forwards to prevent the moral hazard problems of medical service demander through global budget and raising technology content of doctors, and prevent the moral hazard problems of medical service supplier through increasing the rate of paid by patient. Meanwhile, discussed how to set fair and reasonable the rate of paid by paient.In practice, this paper summarizes specific operation of preventing moral hazard between Britain and Germany, then introduces the expression and generation causes of medical insurance moral hazard in every period in our country. In the end, on basis of integrating theory with various countries' practice for preventing moral hazard, according to the cause of moral hazard in our country, this paper separately from positive incentive schemes and negative incentive schemes to stduy the moral hazard problems of medical service in our country.