Research On The Degree Of Moral Hazard In Our Medical Insurance

China’s medical insurance system was established in 1952, including public health and labor insurance system. Since the reform and opening up, the system was supplemented by the basic medical care insurance, supplementary health insurance (including commercial health insurance) and so on. At present, China has established a wide coverage and multi-level medical insurance system, which is based on basic medical care insurance and complemented by other insurance.China’s medical insurance system has undergone a fundamental change, but the problem of moral hazard has been in existence for a long time, which was various and has tremendous range and deeper level. This not only led to the raise of medical price and cost, but also affects the rational allocation of medical resources and protection efforts. How to suppress the moral hazard of health insurance becomes one of the most significant issues in the field of whether the universal health care system can become successful implementation and ongoing operation.Chinese scholars studying the moral hazard of health insurance are mainly based on qualitative research, and their research are focused on the theoretical analysis of its existance useing the methods of welfare economics, utility theory and game theory. This paper confirmed and analyzed the degree of moral hazard in the medical care insurance using quantitative method.This paper draws on the latest methods of foreign medical insurance to measure the degree of moral hazard, and combined with China’s actual situation. Based on the current situation and the moral hazard behavior in China’s medical insurance system, the paper analysis the elasticity of different insurance plans (urban workers’medical insurance, medical insurance for urban residents, the new agricultural cooperative medical insurance, public health and commercial health insurance), using Utility theory, Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.The elasticity can indicates the degree of moral hazard. Higher value means higher risk.The paper also analysis the factors of elasticity by multiple regression models. The results show that public health has greater risk of moral hazard, which is followed by medical insurance for urban workers and urban residents. The new rural cooperative medical insurance has smaller risk of moral hazard. Furthermore, the paper finds that the degree of moral hazard is negative to co-payment rate, education, household size, and positive to age. Finally, the paper gives the appropriate control measures of moral hazard from the view of moral, medical reform deepening, credit system and regime improvements. This paper expanded and refined the domestic research from quantitative perspective of moral hazard, which has theoretical and practical significance.