Research On Tunneling Behavior Based On Game Analysis

The equity division of the last century resulted in extensive conflicts of interest between large shareholder and minority shareholders of the listed companies.Tunneling has become a very widespread and serious problem in capital market because the mechanism which protects the interests of minority shareholders is not sound and the mechanism which constrains the behavior of major shareholders is imperfect. Tunneling not only has serious implications to the operations of the listed company, but also against the legitimate rights of the minority shareholders. Therefore, how to curb to against he major shareholders and how to ensure the healthy and orderly development of listed companies in China's securities market is an issue to be resolved bite.Study of the entire article follows the main line:"questions---describe phenomenon---analyze the reasons---propose regulatory measures ".Firstly, I analyzed the case between Chongqing Industrial and Delong, described the status of tunneling in China, and analyzed the way of tunneling in China's capital markets. Secondly, I analyzed the reasons for this phenomenon from inside and outside the angle. China's economic system, the characteristics of the securities market, the special mode of listing and the special structure of ownership are external factors of tunneling. Benefits of control are the internal factor of tunneling. Lastly, I established the game model between the large shareholders and the commission, who is regulators, found the factors that affect the balance of the game, and give some suggestions to the regulators.By analyzing the reasons for this phenomenon and the game model, I reached the following conclusions:tunneling can be contained effectively by strengthening the construction of the legal system about investor protection, playing the role of public opinion, establishing checks and balances, pulling in "substantive equality" principle of shareholders and change the company listed model.