An Empirical Study Of The Ownership Structure Of Pramids And The Listed Company Value

The relationship of ownership structure and the enterprise values effected by the concentration is always a hot issue. In the past researchers suggested that the distinction of ownership and operational rights bring about the agent conflicts between the share holders and the managers. Resently more reserchers found that most of the companies were controlled by the ultimate owners and the"pyramid"ownership structure exited widely in his study.So that the conficts of the strong shareholders and the minority shareholders came into being.This paper studies the control right and the cash-flow right of listed companies of China and measures the control right of share holders in a new method.The recent corporate governance literature has emphasized the distinction between control and cash-flow rights but has disregarded measurement issues.Control rights may be measured by immediate votes,the voting rights as traced through ownership chains.We compare the ability of various measures to identify the effects of ownership concentration on share valuation using the data of 1561 Chinese listed companies.The widely used weakest-link principle does not perform well in our analysis.This paper empasises that there is a distinction between the voting rights and the control rights.We can use the Shapley-Shubik index to measure the control rights of the ultimate owners in the pyramid.Then we can study the relationship between the enterprise value and the ownership structure.The higher of ultimate cash flow rights,the higher of the listed company value.Then the greater of the distinction between control and cash-flow rights ,the smaller of the listed company value.And the last the more of the protection of the law,the higer of the listed company value.