A Study On The Motives Of Controlling Shareholder's Embezzlement Of Listed Company's Funds After Public Offering

Recently, many scholars pay attention to the governance of listed companies, they found that the most important agency problem is not between shareholders and managers, but between controlling shareholders and small shareholders. They study the tunneling of the controlling shareholders using theoretical analysis and empirical approach, and they confirm that the embezzlement of listed company funds is one of the most important ways that controlling shareholders damage the interests of minority shareholders. The findings point out the future direction of company governance.At present, more researches focus on the forms or policy recommendations about the embezzlement of listed company's funds through theoretical analysis. There are only a few empirical papers on the embezzlement of listed company's funds, they study the relationship between the value of the company and the embezzlement or between the nature of controlling shareholders and the embezzlement. My study is not as same as the others. First of all, we study the period after rights offering, and secondly, instead of studying the still factors such as the concentration of ownership or the financial datas, we considerate the action of controlling shareholders after public offering. Through the analysis of the various factors affecting embezzlement, we point out the governance of listed companies and market regulation.Based on the previous studies, we sum up the recent theoretical and empirical research. Then we point out that the relevant papers did not study the embezzlement of listed company under rights offering background. To compensate for this study fields, we study the factors of embezzlement after rights offerings. Finally, based on the empirical results, we give the corresponding policy recommendations.We examine 204 companies that raised capital through public offering from 2000 to 2003, and study the motives of controlling shareholder's embezzlement of listed company's funds in china. In this paper, we choose the increase of controlling shareholder's embezzlement of listed company's funds as a proxy for tunneling. Then we use five variables for proxies for the influence factors, including the nature of controlling shareholders, the probability of buying the rights, and the probability of changing investment projects. We study the relations between these factors and the embezzlement of listed company's funds.