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The Research On The Strong Shareholders' Self-Interest Actions And Governance Of Listed Companies Without Shareholder Equity Culture

Posted on:2009-12-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:T J LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360272981673Subject:MPAcc
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1. The research background and objectivesComparing with the western market more than two hundreds years developing history, what our capital market has developed during the past ten years is wonderful. With the supervision regulation and market system established, especially recently split share structure reform of listed companies, clearing the debts and solving the assurances for the listed companies, comprehensive treatment of the security company and so on, our market infrastructure and functions have basically completed. While our capital market is still immature, the controlling shareholders of listed companies play a very important role to lead to many illegal actions. So lack of Shareholder's Equity Cultures is the cultural sources for the controlling shareholders to make the self-interest behavior of listed companies.The market construction has developed so well while cultural construction doesn't match with it. The non-self-motion and processing temporarily of market development makes us lack of the basis of cultivating Shareholder's Equity Culture. In addition, the traditional thoughts of Chinese imperial power are another factor restricting the development of Shareholder's Equity Culture.Lacking of the background of Shareholder's Equity Culture makes the controlling shareholders unclear for their responsibilities, rights and interests. Additionally, the distempered laws and regulations in the market and the interest motivation, the controlling shareholders will make use of their dominated advantages to carry out many self-interest actions.Through discussing all kinds of self-interest behaviors made by the controlling shareholders without Shareholder's Equity Culture, the author wants to disclose the significant role that the shareholder equity cultural construction playing on the health development of our capital market, and propose the three effective measures to govern the controlling shareholders self-interest: cultural push, supervision reinforcement and system imported.2. Main ContentThe thesis contains six chapters; the main contents are as follows:Chapter 1 introduces the research background, aim, thought, main content and contributions.Chapter 2 is describing the connotation, development history and modern statement of Shareholder's Equity Culture. The Shareholder's Equity Culture is the result which the capital market develops on some stages. It has developed for hundreds years at the mature capital market, including the evaluation on the Shareholder's Equity Culture, protection on the investors'right, the statement the shareholder equity investment taking up in people's life, and so on. While our country does not have the real Shareholder's Equity Culture, the investors'rights have not got the respect in our society; the honest culture of listed companies is weak; listed companies have not carried out their trust responsibilities, put the investors'interests at the first place and make the shareholders interest be the management aim. The controlling shareholders abuse their right to invade the other investors'interests and show their authority as the dominators and interest enjoyment independently. The mid-and small investors are not very clear with their rights and do not know the proper way to carry out their right. When they are aggrieved by others, they are numbly and have a little conscious to protect their right.Chapter 3 discusses the existence mechanism of the controlling shareholders self-interest behaviors. The non-self-motion and processing temporarily of market development makes us lack of the basis of cultivating Shareholder's Equity Culture. In addition, the traditional thoughts of Chinese imperial power are another factor restricting the development of Shareholder's Equity Culture.Lacking of the background of Shareholder's Equity Culture makes the controlling shareholders unclear for their responsibilities, rights and interests. Additionally, with the innate controlling advantages, the distempered laws and regulations in the market and the interest motivation, the controlling shareholders will make use of their advantages to carry out many self-interest behaviors.Chapter 4, at the lacking of the background of Shareholder's Equity Culture, analyzes the behaviors the controlling shareholders controlling the listed companies to practice self-interest behaviors. According to whether there is the restriction or not, the author divides the controlling shareholders'self-interest actions into improper actions and illegal actions. Implementing improper behaviors include the shareholders board, director board and boards of supervisors of listed companies controlling the companies, manipulating profit allocation, putting the influence on the refinancing and foreign investments and utilizing the important asset reforming to pursue their interests. As for illegal actions, it can be showed in three aspects. First of all, it is taking up the capital through the daily operations of listed companies, asking it to supply the assurance for other companies. Secondly, it does the illegal dealing at the secondary market, including municipal share price, low-down deal and short hand deal. Finally, it does not discover the relating or important information to harm the other investors'interest.Chapter 5 studies the influence of controlling shareholder's self-interest behavior, which mainly embodies as follows: influence the profit-making capacity of listed company, harm the ordinary investors'profit, hamper the healthy development of market, and cause the loss of credit.Chapter 6 puts forward the countermeasure to govern the controlling shareholder's self-interest behavior .Firstly, establish Shareholder's Equity Culture from multi-aspect and multi-angle, covering the mutual propel by supervision level, stock company and investors; on the level of strengthening supervision, shareholder should be governed in normal supervision scope, reinforce the supervision to interrelated exchange and the information reveal of shareholder and other important items, strengthen the cooperation among the credit supervision department, state-owned property supervision department and judicial department in order to make a crisscross network of supervision ;on the level of regulation construction, bring in the"reconciliation"and"Group lawsuit"system so as to increase the cost of violation of law and regulation, enhance the efficiency of supervision. 3. Major Contribution(1) Analysis on the culture level of controlling shareholder's self-interest behavior, creatively probe into the influence to Shareholder's Equity Culture construction by Chinese traditional imperial power ideology and the process of market development, reveal the cultural sources of self-interest is the loss of Shareholder's Equity Culture.(2) To sort out and paragraph the development process of Shareholder's Equity Culture for the first time.(3) Arrange and classify the specific represents of controlling shareholder's self-interest behavior systematically(4) Definitely bring forward three measures to govern the self-interest behavior of controlling shareholder: establish Shareholder's Equity Culture, reinforce supervision and bring in the supervision system simultaneously.
Keywords/Search Tags:Shareholder's Equity Culture, Controlling Shareholder's Behavior, Listed Company, Governance
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