Research On The Double Moral Hazard Problems Of State-Owned Enterprise

When the managerial authority separates from the ownership of enterprise, the problem of agency appears. At present, lots of researches are mainly concentrated on the moral hazard problem of agent. Because of the information asymmetry, both of the principal and agent proceed from one's own interests, utilizing one's own information advantage and the behavior of opportunism. Not only the agent, but the principal take on the moral hazard problem. It is proved that the moral hazard of principal-agent is double moral hazard. Due to our country State-owned Enterprise's complex principal-agent chain, the absence of initial principal and administrative intervention, the two parties of the state-owned enterprise's principal-agent are interested in their own benefits, which results in the double moral hazard problem in state-owned enterprise.In the paper, the characters and the reasons in the state-owned enterprise's double moral hazard problem are analyzed. Based on the game theory and information economics analytical method, the state-owned enterprise's principal-agency model and the game model are testified. At the same time, the moral hazard problems of principal are analyzed, which are divided into the non-market and the seeking-rent risk. Through state-owned enterprise peculiar "conspire" and is it seek and rent the research of the behavior to "abuse the authority" to entrepreneur, analyses that "conspires" and "abuses the authority" etc. to seek the deep reason which rents the behavior in the state-owned enterprise of our country, amplify in enterprise's entrepreneur's institutional improvement of going abroad how to establish a kind of relation of checking and balancing that encourage as well as restrains from between the owner and entrepreneur. In trusting the analysis of the problem of double moral hazard, in order to prevent the opportunism behaviors of the principal-agent, the market mechanism is very important. The recommendations of incentive and constrain mechanism are given, and put forward the rules of improving the principal and the agent market operation including two parties' action, and develop the constraint and inspiration mechanism so as to avoid the State-Owned Enterprise's double moral hazard.