Research On The Principal-Agency Mechanism Of Our Country State-Owned Large And Middle Scale Enterprise

With further strengthening and perfecting of our country socialist market economy system and the reform and open policy, our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises' reform and the development entered the critical moment. How should our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises adapt to it, how to solve the contradictory and difficult of state asset management, how to further enhance the benefit , which have became the vital realistic questions to be urgent needs to study the solution, which are related with the socialist prosperity and decline ,success or failure. The questions of existing in our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises are various, but the main prominent question is agency problem. Therefore, this article, taking the principal-agent theory as the instruction, has carried on the discussion to the agency problem existing in our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises.This article takes our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises' principal-agency mechanism as the research object, uses the standard research primarily, the standard research and the real diagnosis research unifying, the qualitative investigation and the quantitative investigation unifying, the macroscopic angle of view and the microscopic angle of view unifying. The full text altogether divides into seven parts. In the theory review foundation, with principal-agency theory, to our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises' principal-agency problems, the article makes a comprehensive combing, discovers principal-agency problems which exist in the our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises, has mainly carried on the analysis in view of the problems from three aspects, and puts forward our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises' principal-agency mechanism implementation proposal.Firstly, in view of the problems that the principal-agency level which exists the ourcountry state-owned large and middle scale enterprises are many, that the initial trustee by the hypothesized form exists, the article makes the classified agency pattern design to the our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises;Secondly, in view of the our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises operator's power insufficient problem, the article has studied to operator's incentive surveillance mechanism, obtains it is must to operator's incentive in asymmetrical the information, the excitation density and the risk share are relevant to operator's risk preference, diligent cost coefficient and income earning of an enterprise variance and so on factor related;Thirdly, in view of in the principal-agency bureau human's dual benefit problem which exists the our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises, which is in sole possession of the question - plot to the our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises, the article makes the discussion, obtains the surveillance and incentive to inspector general affects operator's work enthusiasm, the embezzlement degree;Fourthly, the article solves the problems. Based on the above these analyses, the article proposes the detailed policy to our country state-owned large and middle scale enterprises' development, af the same time, also has made the analysis on the feasibility and some difficulties of operating.Finally, the article further summarizes the full text, obtains its conclusion of research.