Research On Moral Hazard Of The Comprehensive Budget Management

Because of principal-agent question , agent's moral hazard(namely budget slack) is inevitable in the practice of the comprehensive budget management, even very serious in our country, one of the most difficult problems in the comprehensive budget management.It is necessary for the whole enterprise to be divided into responsibility levels(namely responsibility center) so that it can implement comprehensive budget management effectively.But every responsibility center is the unit of special budget's organization and execution.Because of dealing with special operating management;every responsibility center managers usually obtain more information on market than the owners of enterprise. As a result, every responsibility center managers'moral hazard is inevitable. Comprehensive budget management is regarded as multi-level principal-agent relationships on condition that information that principal and agent obtain is asymmetric.For different levels principal-agent relationships, we only study profit center managers'moral hazard because information that the owner (principal) and the profit center managers(agent)obtain on market is asymmetric.This thesis includes six chapters as follows:Chapter one,The foreword mainly illustrates the background and the significance of disquisition;Chapter two, Comprehensive budget management is principally introduced through concept,the content system and organization and execution etc;Chapter three, It primarily details relevant theory of moral hazard ,and issues initially the reasons of the existing moral hazard about comprehensive budget management;Chapter four, the author analyzes the reasons of the profit center managers'moral hazard with game theory in depth, the paper points out the profit center managers'moral hazard causes uncooperative equilibrium of game between the owner and the profit center managers, and discusses that with models;Chapter five, the author tries to issue the possibility of accomplishing game equilibrium between the owner and the profit center managers through incentive mechanism design;Chapter six, It proves the incentive mechanism avoids the profit center managers'moral hazard through a case to a certain degree,and eliminates some budget slack phenomena of comprehensive budget management.