Study On Credit Principal-agent Relation Of State-owned Commercial Bank

The credit operation is commercial bank's core business. The credit risk with it is banking industry's main risk. the high grade credit property is foundation which the bank steady management and the social stability development. To joins WTO in our country and under the financial globalization situation, our country state-owned commercial bank is facing the unprecedented opportunity and the stern challenge. First, since long-time, in under credit policy influence, the state-owned commercial banks is been insufficient to the loan enterprise's restraint. It is not high for the credit property quality to causes the massive properties which it is not good to accumulate. Latent risk of the bank is huge. Second, the foreign capital bank and the emerging joint stock system bank rely on its effective incentive mechanism to cause serious talented person's draining of state-owned commercial bank. Third, along with our country money market gradual opening, competition between the bank is more and more intense, various banks capture the fine customer by its excellent conditions, the state-owned bank survival is threaten.Principal-agency question of the credit has become restricts the state-owned commercial banks to deepen the bottleneck which the reform and develops forwardPrincipal-agent relations in the state-owned commercial banks, it must been specially process principal-agent relations in credit. Because the credit operation comparing the state-owned commercial bank any other business, it not only the request agent relates is specially important, is complex, moreover the agent cost is specially high, the agent risk also specially concentrates, in a big way speciallyThis article Has outlined the principal-agent related knowledge and the theory carried .The analysis discovers the state-owned commercial bank not only need to face restraint question of the soft budget which undertakes the massive policy-type burden caused also to face the credit information transmission slowly and the distortion question which excessively many principal-agent levels caused the agent control and the restraint attenuation causes. Discovered through the establishment principal-agent model that: under the agent relations in the information not symmetry and the multi-layered principal-agent of the credit, the most superior incentive mechanism is not merely surplus demands under the power and the surplus domination maximum limit correspondence risk between the principal and agent shares reasonably, reduces the...