An Economics Analysis Of Corporate Good Faith

Being short of credit will have a great impact on our social and economic life, which is worldwide, contemporary and extended to the human nature. It has widespread and profound significance to conduct the analysis of how to govern credit failure and ensure it operates with credit. As the main participant in the market, enterprise's good faith has important influence on the efficiency of market economy. In view of this, this thesis chooses the enterprise good faith as a breakthrough point to analyze the good faith problem in the market, economic, political and even social life.This thesis focuses on the analysis of good faith from an economic view, using information economics, non-cooperative game theory, to describe the microscopic, intermediate, and macroscopic mechanism of enterprise good faith, and to discover reason for good faith failure, influential factors and solutions, which provides theoretical support both for the viewpoint of enterprise should preserve good faith and for the establishment of the market good faith system for the government.Chapter 1 is mainly an introduction, which describes the research backgrounds, the purpose of the analysis, the meaning of the analysis and current research outcomes both in China and in other countries. Based on the research conducted by earlier economists, this thesis defines the concept of good faith and enterprise good faith from multiple views, both Chinese, western, traditional and modern, and provides some preliminary discussion about the importance of good faith, the influential factors, the reasons for failure, and the consequences resulted.The core parts will be covered from chapter 3 to chapter 5, which elaborate on the internal and external good faith problems encountered by companies from multiple views, microscopic, intermediate, and macroscopic. Chapter 3 is micro-individual-perspective. We analyze good faith problems between enterprise and employees to provide some solutions to managing the agents' behavior, by establishing principal-agent model, analyze good faith problems between enterprise and banks by solving adverse selection model and moral hazard model, and regard good faith presented by enterprise to consumers as intangible asset and the prestige capital. In chapter 4, from an intermediate-organization perspective, we have some discussion on behaviors between enterprise and the third party involved, and behaviors between enterprise and trader, and make suggestion that we should convert the one-time game to a repeating one, which makes players initiative. In the...