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Research On Principal-agent Problem In Venture Capital

Posted on:2007-12-01Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:J P WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360185989999Subject:Agricultural Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the scientific development ideology as the guide, to realize the thorough change of economic growth pattern and to enhance profoundly the self-innovation ability are very significant to the health and rapid development of the venture capital industry. Therefore, to choose the principal-agent problem in venture capital as the research target is of great theoretical value and of realistic significance to the raise of efficiency of our country′s venture capital as well as to the development of high and new technology and industry which would enable us to own ourselves self-oriented intellectual property.The article consists of 8 chapters with the main ideas of each chapter respectively as follows:Chapter 1 Introduction This chapter offers some introductions to the background, necessity and significance of this research, to the achievements attained at home and abroad up to now, to the fundamental train of thought and content, to the research method, and to the innovation attained in this research.Chapter 2 Study on the relationship of the double principal-agent and its problem in venture capital. First of all, this chapter introduces some theories about principal-agent problems of venture capital (moral hazard theory and adverse selection theory) with mathematical models as tools, which paves the way for further study about double principal-agent of venture capital in the following chapters; secondly, beginning with the relationship of double principal-agent of venture capital, this chapter summarizes theoretically the operators of venture capital, the operation process, and the causes and types of the relationship of double principal-agent of venture capital, which paves the necessary way from the background for the following study; finally, this chapter puts forward the problem about the double principal-agent existing in venture capital.Chapter 3 through Chapter 5 is the core of this research. This part studies thoroughly in theory and from institution arrangement respectively the resolutions to the problem about the principal-agent between investors and venture capitalists as well as the solutions to the problem about principal-agent between venture capitalists and venture capital entrepreneurs. And it also studies how to resolve the problem about double principal-agent in venture capital...
Keywords/Search Tags:Venture Capital, Principal-agent, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, Suggestions and Advice
PDF Full Text Request
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