The Research On Bank-firm Relationships Under Asymmetric Information

Bank and enterprise are two important equities in economy, so the relationship between them is of great significance. Weather bank-firm relationship is harmonious influences not only their performance in microcosm, but also efficiency of resource allocation and stable economic growth in macrocosm. With the development of Chinese reform oriented to market economy system, bank and firm are becoming more and more independent, and the distribution mechanism of benefit between them is gradually market-led. Meanwhile, due to advancing gradually of Chinese reform, the attainment is not a progress by leaps and bounces, but one step by step. In the background of the transitional economy society, there are many factors influencing harmonious development of bank-firm relationship in both macrocosm and microcosm. What they are? This is worth analyzing and probing in realistic society.Based on related theories of information economics, contract economics and institutional economics, using research method of theory analysis and case study to find the final incidence of the development of bank-firm relationship and the factories which influence it, this thesis systematical analyses the current relationship between bank and enterprises both from macroeconomic angle and microeconomic angle.Firstly, the dissertation puts forward a theoretical framework for the research on the train of thought that we should put a question, analyze it, and settle it, on the theoretical basement of information economics and related theory of contract economics and institutional economics. The thesis points out that credit rationing which is both the result of asymmetric information between bank and firm but also a rational choice of bank, has a few negative influences on society. To solve the asymmetric information between bank and enterprise, certain institution arrangement is necessary. So the most excellent contract can reduce adverse selection before trade and moral hazard behind trade to the lowest level. Because the contract between bank and firm is not perfect, the efficient contract governance institution and external institution environment are needed. There are three different contract governance institutions: self-enforcing agreements, court governance and authority governance in integration and the efficiency of which is related to certain institution environment. So, to a certain degree, whether relationship between bank and firm can be improved depends on decrease of asymmetric information between bank and firm, which hinges on contract devise and contract governance between bank and firm and certain institution environment.Secondly, the dissertation analyzes bank-firm relationship of China under the theoretical framework given above. The idea is that the asymmetric information is more and more becoming the source of obstacle to trade between bank and enterprise with the market-oriented development of bank-firm relationship in China. However, in the background of the transitional economy society, the contract design and contract governance can not deal with the asymmetric information between bank and firm and it's negative externalities efficiently. Therefore, the long-term contract relationship between them is necessary. Nevertheless, there are many negative factors in our external institution environment, such as the defects of property right institution, the poor competition for market, the backwardness of credit environment, as well as the poor protection provided by law.Finally, based on theoretical analysis in the two parts above, the dissertation points out the crucial factors in the development of harmonious relationship between bank and firm by analyzing three typical cases, and gives a few concrete proposals for the establishment and development of the long-term contract relationship between bank and firm to cope with the questions in those cases.