Research On The Selection Of Purchasing Mode Of Bulk Commodities

In the procurement of goods,the market demand uncertainty and spot price uncertainty will directly affect the choice of enterprises in the sourcing strategies.Motivated by the recent fierce price fluctuation of many commodities under competitive environment,this paper examines product sourcing strategies in two ways.First,through the Bertrand model and the Bayesian game to study the impact of spot price volatility and enterprises forecasting accuracy on shipping service sourcing strategies;Second,through Nash bargaining and risk aversion model to study whether the manufacturer participate in the joint negotiation of forward contracts,and the optimal forward contract quantity and contract price.The structure of this paper as follows:In the chapter 1,introduction part.We introduction the research background,the research status,innovation points method of this paper and research.In the chapter 2,we study the effect of different contract forms in ocean freight industry on two competitive shippers.Shippers A and B procure a commodity in oversea market and transport it to a local market,then they engage in a Bertrand competition.We consider a situation in which shipper A purchases ocean freight services through long-term contract to lock the shipping price in advance,and shipper B purchases ocean freight services in the shipping spot market.The spot price of the ocean freight services is correlated with the uncertain demand of the commodity.Thus,the demand forecasts of the shippers also update their respective beliefs on the spot price.After updating their updated beliefs on,they determine their respective selling price of the commodity.We find that although shipper A has the freight cost advantage,shipper B still can achieve more profit than shipper A if the freight spot price is large volatile or its forecast is sufficiently accurate.Further study reveals that shippers may benefit from the increase of freight spot price volatility because the shippers can adjust their pricing strategy flexibly.Our study also shows that the shipper A can always benefit from the forecast improvement of its own and shipper B,however,only under certain conditions the shipper B can benefit from the forecast accuracy improvements.In the chapter 3,we study the effects of joint negotiation in commodity procurement.We consider a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier and two downstream manufacturers,where there exist two sourcing modes for the manufacturers to procure the commodity: forward contract and spot market.The manufacturers first engage in a sourcing game by determining whether to adopt forward contract.Then an agent represents the manufacturer(s)adopting forward contract to negotiate a forward contract with the supplier(a Nash bargaining game).Finally,the supplier and the manufacturers trade(buy or sell)the commodity in a spot market,and the manufacturers simultaneously determine their respective outputs of the final product.We find that the manufacturer(s)hold a short position if the spot price volatility is relatively low,hold a long position if the price volatility is large,and do not adopt forward contract if the spot price volatility is moderate.Further study shows that the joint negotiation always reduces the contract quantity of a single manufacturer.However,the joint negotiation leads to a favorable contract price for the manufacturers if and only the bargaining power improvement is relatively large.An interesting finding is that when the bargaining power improvement is moderate the joint negotiation can lead to a “win-win-win” situation,where the supplier,manufacturers B,and A all benefit from joint negotiation.We classify that the bargaining power improvement always benefits the manufacturers but hurts the supplier.