The Study On The Licensing Schemes Of Technology Under Asymmetric Information

Based on the researches that have been carried out by the formers on theories of technology innovation and licensing, considering the problem of asymmetric information, we studied the licensing schemes of the patentee under asymmetric information. Firstly the characteristic and nature of technology market, the asymmetric information in it, and the situation of licensing are discussed in this dissertation. Secondly, based on the theories we construct models to analyze the behavior of the patentee when the licensee has private information about its marginal product cost before licensing, and when the patentee has private information about its technology value in the production market of homogenous stackelberg and heterogeneous bertrand using the licensed technology. Here the patentee is considered as an insider in the models of homogenous stackelberg and heterogeneous bertrand. Moreover, we present the patentee's optimal linear licensing schemes that satisfy the constraints and objective functions. This dissertation combines the methods of systems analysis and emphases, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis to probe into the optimal licensing scheme option and determine the fixed fee or/and royalty. The discussion of this dissertation aims at supplying feasible theoretic reference for the participants of the technology transactions to make decision. The intention is to bring economic factors into playing more role in technology market and therefore to advance the quality and efficiency of technology transactions. It will be found that the studies here have all-important meanings for the construction, development and perfection of technology market in our country.