A Study On The Goverance Of Licensing And R&D Strategy Of Standardized Technology

In a intellectual property-dominated technological environment,the combination of technological standard and patented technology becomes the developing trend in the IT industry. In this case,the compatibility of technological standard and the exclusiveness of patented technology are the two sides of the basic contradiction which runs through the the enforcement of standardazation from the beginning to the end.Ocne the standard is set,the standard manufacturer have to be lisensed by the holder of the essential patent,or he is not allowed to do producing and selling against the stanardised product.For the sake of the above matter,the disputes for the licensing of standardised technology in IT industry have never been ended since the1990s.Thus,the means of the licensing is ineed need to be modified.On the other hand,as a key member of WTO, China has already fully got involved in the global standarzation,and the chinese enterprise always acted as a patent licensee.In a multilevel technology spillover envirment, how to adjust the way of lisencing and R&D strategy,so as to achieve its own techonology accumulation,is becoming more and more urgent for the chinese high-tech enterprise. With these facts,this paper have done a comprehansive and detailed research about the two problem,and the research is organised as follows:1.Fundamental research. The combination of IP and technological standard was firstly introduced as the research background, and then patent thicket and hold up as the troubles in the enforcement of standardization. With regard to such troubles, the organizational forms of collective standardization and their respective functions were discussed.Essential patent holder was tend to exact royalty much higher than its intrinsic value,once the standard was setted.On that account, SSO requested for IP disclosure and FRAND licensing.Based on the latest foreign research,the various meanings of FRAND licensing were studied in detail in the context of ex post hold-up, bilateral licensing negotiation and ex ante technology competition.Finally, further policy suggestion was provided according to the checks and balances between patent holder and standard user in those contexts.2.Model research. In the previous part,ex ante negotiation was identified as a proper way to better technology lisensing. A model of sequential investment was applied in the sense of homogeneous investment,firstly characterizing the profit and investment incentive of the two licensing parties, and then resulting in double hold-up which was lack of efficiency for the licensing in some case. To optimize the licensing procedure, the effect of the enforcement of ex ante negotiation on both development and manufacture was invetisigated,and the applicability of ex ante negotiation under the efficient investment was confirmed.It is showed that (1)the joint expected surplus increases in the ex ante negotiantion,and the manufacturer's hold-up is solved (2)the short-term enforcement enhances the manufacturer's investment and the value of technology, ex ante negotiation is feasible;the long-term enforcement causes R&D deterrence, ex ante negotiation is less feasible.In the enforcement of technological standarzation,there always exists technology spillover between technology leader and follower. Accordingly, some follower tends to achieve its own technology accumulation and further innovation through technology licensing. Therefore this paper attempts to make a contractual study on the course of technology licensing:a model of sequential bilateral investment was applied in the sense of incomplete contrct, firstly characterizing the profit and investment incentive of the two parties in one-side licensing,and then resulting in hold up.By the assumption that the core technology was modified by the follower,the back-grant licensing was introduced,and the two parties' profit and R&D were investigated respectively.3. Empirical study. This part of research is designed to verify those conclusions that was proposed in the model research.First,the patent information was gethered from4standard setting organizations (SSO) during the patent disclosure.Then, by using the method of patent citation,the performance of those patented technology was investigated in3successive standard period.Secondly,GSM international standard was investigated in a case study,in which the evolution and the shift of standardised technology was respectively taken as research dimension.In the case study,the effect of double-side licensing on the shift of techonology was fully confirmed.In the last part of the research,a performance appraisal system for periodical standardised technology was established.The eovolution of the standardised technology was stimulated by tracing its form,then the basic procedure and application mode were provided.Finally,a calculation example was finished.The performance appraisal system is very practical and useful for the technilogy follower in the enforcement of standardazation.