Research On Shareholder Regulation Of Commercial Banks

With the development of china's banker industry and the acceleration of china's open process, many capitals are invested in commercial banks, leading to the multiplication of ownership structure in banks. But during this process, many commercial bank's shareholders using their control power or important influence to gain many insider trading. Those not only harm other shareholders and creditors' benefit, but also threaten china's financial safety, even hinder the development of china's economy.Shareholders make invest in order to pursue profit. In market economy, the access to the market shouldn't be restricted. But because of the frangibility and the infectivity of the bank industry, the shareholders need to be supervised by the government. The supervision of the government to the shareholders focuses on such things. Firstly, the government supervises the access to the market. Through some restrictions, the government heightens the threshold of the access to investing in the bank industry, eliminating the unqualified shareholder and assuring the qualification of the shareholder. Secondly, the government supervises the behavior of the shareholders. By preventing the insider trading of the bank shareholders and restricting the erosion to the bank and other shareholders, the government assures the qualification of the shareholder behavior. By certain institution design, the government make shareholder pursue their own profit as well as facilitating the development of the bank industry and the advancement of the economy.We treat the bank shareholder as our research object. By the regulation on the bank shareholder, we introduce the active shareholders to improve the corporate governance of the bank and advance the ability of the management and earningThis article follows as such. Firstly, by reviewing the bank regulation theory, the ownership structure theory and the commercial bank corporate governance theory, we understand the relating theory of the shareholder regulation. Secondly, we shape the qualified shareholder theory by bringing forward the standard on the character and the behavior of the bank shareholder. Thirdly, we analyze the three major shareholder of Chinese banks—the state-owned shareholder, the foreign shareholder and the privately owned shareholder, pointing out their weaknesses and advantages. Fourthly, we make statistically empirical analysis on the relationship between the ownership structure and the bank efficiency, finding out the character of the ownership structure and the shareholder to improve bank efficiency. At last, we bring forward some advice on how to introduce qualified shareholder, optimize the ownership structure of the bank and improve the corporate governance.