Study On Wealth Redistribution Effect In Shareholder Structure Reform

Due to the special ownership structure, from the birth of our capital market, circulating shares and non-circulating shares were divided. Such a system arrangement has indeed played a positive role when capital market first set up. But with the development of the capital market, problem of shareholder structure exposed, not only effect equity financing function, but also Reduce efficiency in optimize the allocation of resources, effect stable development of capital market and converge with international market after WTO. Thus, discussion on problem of shareholder structure was started, all agreed that shareholder structure reform is a must. Under this background, the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "Notice on problems of listed companies experimenting in shareholder structure reform" on April 29, 2005.It means experimenting in shareholder structure reform started.Today, shareholder structure reform is drawing to end; there will be further opening up in the future. At this moment, a systematic study on policy design and implementation results in shareholder structure reform, a summary of success and failure, will provide us important theoretical basis for further opening up in our capital market, and there are high theoretical value in protecting fully circulation successfully.Specific research ideas of this paper as follows:First, in the first part, discuss the origin of the shareholder structure reform, recalling previous study in this field. Secondly, in the main part of this paper, design a wealth distribution model first, to find out equity consideration which can give same wealth to both sides in reform. And compare actual consideration with equity consideration, to talk about whether consideration is fair. Then, through empirical analysis, discuss fair degree of listed companies which have joined the shareholder structure reform. Thirdly, build quantile regression model, talk about different trend and different fair degree in designing consideration with different state-owned shares on the basis of empirical research, further study effect of state-owned shares in consideration designing.This paper is divided into five chapters, specific structured as follows:Chapter 1 : Preface. Introduce problem discussed in this paper, and significance of this topic, define the basic concept, then discuss basic research idea, structure, and innovations, in the end, give the source and processing of the data.Chapter 2: Shareholder structure theoretical research synthesis. This chapter can be divided into three parts: first, talk about origin of shareholder structure reform; then From the existing literature,discuss studies on shareholder structure reform.Chapter 3: Wealth distribution model and empirical research in Shareholder structure reform. First, give a wealth distribution model; find out equity consideration which can give same wealth to both sides in reform. And compare actual consideration with equity consideration, to talk about whether consideration is fair. Then, through empirical analysis, discuss fair degree of listed companies which have joined the shareholder structure reform. The empirical results show that, when determine consideration, namely in the wealth redistribution game between circulating shareholders and non-circulating shareholders, non-circulating shareholders be in a very strong position, benefit of circulating shareholders have not been protected according policy requirements. The reason may lie in the current system design of shareholder structure reform, as well as non-rational judgments of small and medium-sized investors.Chapter 4: Quantile regression model and empirical research in Shareholder structure reform. First introduce quantile regression model and bootstrap method in this chapter, build two quantile regression model which can research different trend and different fair degree in designing consideration with different state-owned shares, Under different quantiles, research the relationship between actual consideration during reform, variable which used for judging its'reasonable degree with shareholder structure.We can get conclusions as follows: No matter consideration is high or low, there is positive impact for state-owned shares on increasing consideration; increased proportion of state-owned shares will lead to increased consideration. In addition, there are differences in different quantiles for positive impact for proportion of state-owned shares on consideration, higher the proportion of state-owned shares is, less significant of positive impact for proportion of state-owned shares on consideration. That is to say, large proportion of state-owned shares is not conducive to the enhancement of consideration. Consistent with the conclusions of existing research, this paper certificate this conclusion quantitatively through quantile regression model, which has much more convincing than traditional theoretical research.By building quantile regression model between variable which used for judging its'reasonable degree and proportion of state-owned shares, we can see that: there is positive impact on variable which used for judging its'reasonable degree from proportion of state-owned shares. With increase of the proportion of state-owned shares, the impact is higher. In addition, the higher proportion of state-owned shares is, more significant of positive impact for proportion of state-owned shares on consideration. The increase of proportion of state-owned shares will substantially increase damage to circulating shareholder. This conclusion is the expansion of existing research results, more deeply prove trend in consideration deciding caused by proportion of state-owned shares: large proportion of state-owned shares is hard damage to benefit of circulating shareholder.In short, in order to protect the legitimate rights of public investors, the regulatory authorities should be considered. With fair and impartial attitude in the process of formulating policy, effectively specifically propose concrete measures to protect public investors. For example, in policy design, give more right to circulating shareholders, not only right of voting; even be directly involved in the process of consideration decision.Only after designing a clear and efficient rule for shareholder structure reform and fully circulation after reform, we can truly protect benefit of circulating shareholders according policy.